How sovereignty became the spearhead of politics in Mali

“Unacceptable” and “indecent” accusations. Monday, September 27, the French Minister of the Armed Forces, Florence Parly, did not mince words to denounce the words of Malian Prime Minister Choguel Kokalla Maïga. On Saturday, before the UN General Assembly, the latter had described the end of Operation Barkhane as “abandonment in full flight”. For several weeks, the rag has been burning between Paris and Bamako following rumors of a possible agreement between the Malian authorities and the Russian paramilitary group Wagner. While Paris considers the possible participation of Russian militiamen incompatible with the French engagement in the Sahel, Mali poses as a free sovereign state to diversify its military alliances if it wishes.

With regard to its African partners, Bamako now holds the same discourse, rejecting any form of interference. While the transitional government, appointed after the military coup of August 18, 2020, had pledged to organize elections within an 18-month period, Prime Minister Choguel Kokalla Maïga spoke in an interview with France 24, the possibility of postponing the ballot. He believes that the deadline set by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) did not correspond to the Malian reality.

What does the transitional government hope to achieve by engaging in a frontal conflict with its partners? Decryption.

The second coup, “a turning point”

If the tensions between France and Mali are emerging today in broad daylight with the Wagner file, they do not date from yesterday. The inexorable deterioration of the country’s security situation despite the Barkhane counterterrorism operation, launched in 2014 by France in the Sahel, has for several years aroused sharp criticism among the Malian population. Under the presidency of Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta already, anti-French demonstrations had erupted on several occasions, to the point that French President Emmanuel Macron had deemed it appropriate to make an update, in Pau, on January 13, 2020, summoning the regional leaders of speak out on the issue.

In this complex security context, the arrival of the military in power by the coup d’état of August 2020 aroused in Paris a mixture of mistrust and caution. If France has cracked a condemnation in principle, she preferred to bet on continuity, believing that the priority should remain the fight against terrorism. A fragile balance, upset by the second putsch of May 24, 2021, during which the military regained control of the transitional government that they themselves had set up.

“When they came to the helm, the officers were novices in politics and they bowed to the demands of the international community. But very quickly, they realized that they had a card to play and could breathe a different direction into politics. Malian “, decrypts Mohamed Ag Assory, Malian analyst, political communication expert and founder of Tidass Strategies Consulting. “The second putsch marked a real turning point with the accession of Assimi Goïta to the post of president of the transition and the appointment of Prime Minister Choguel Kokalla Maïga. The latter, known for his patriotic positions, was one of the figures leading the anti-IBK demonstrations. While the protest movement had been largely ignored by the international community, its coming to power constitutes a political revenge against the allies of Mali. “

A few weeks after the second coup, Emmanuel Macron announced, on June 10, 2021, the end of Operation Barkhane and the redeployment of French troops to Niger, now considered a more reliable ally. An announcement perceived as an affront by the new Malian government.

Regional tensions

In this context, rumors of an agreement between the Malian government and the Russian paramilitary group Wagner, revealed in the press in mid-September, ignited the powder. In the region, the news is also causing a stir. Because if Bamako has seen its power reinforced by several other military coups, notably in Chad and more recently in Guinea, the Malian junta still arouses the mistrust of many of its neighbors. This is particularly the case of Niger which, through its Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hassoumi Massaoudou, sharply criticized the possibility of an agreement with the Wagner group and called on Malian leaders to respect the transition deadlines set by ECOWAS. In response, the Malian regime issued a statement denouncing “unacceptable, unfriendly, and condescending” remarks.

“The Malian junta considers that past experiences have proved that the elections do not make it possible to resolve the problems of the population”, underlines Aly Tounkara, sociologist and director of the Center for Security and Strategic Studies in the Sahel (CE3S). “This vision of seeking legitimacy through the effectiveness and relevance of actions goes against that of its allies, for whom democratic elections must serve as a basis for the implementation of reforms.”

Already suspended from the decision-making bodies of the African Union and ECOWAS, Mali could also be subject to new economic sanctions. After the first coup, the Economic Community of West African States imposed an embargo that severely affected the country’s finances. A situation that some fear today to see reproduce, while the government plans to postpone the date of the elections. “These sanctions had generated a lot of criticism because the economies of the region are interdependent and the measures had had negative repercussions on several countries,” said Mohamed Ag Assory. “If the ECOWAS has so far refrained from reimposing such sanctions, this possibility nevertheless remains a threat. By considering postponing the elections, the junta is playing with fire,” said the analyst.

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A political calculation risky?

While the international relations of the Malian government have deteriorated significantly in recent months, its sovereignist declarations find a certain echo among a fringe of the Malian population, especially on social networks, where the tendencies of independence of power are greeted by many. messages of support. On September 22, thousands of people demonstrated in Bamako in favor of the military and against the interference of foreign powers. “The thirst for independence and the growing mistrust of international partners is a real phenomenon”, underlines Mohamed Ag Assory. “But it must be understood that this movement emanates mainly from city dwellers, little affected by the security crisis, while 80% of Malians live in rural areas and do not have the means to assert their point of view. one can wonder if the hard sovereignist line embodied by the junta really reflects the aspirations of the people as a whole. “

>> To read also: “In Mali, a new war of influence between France and Russia”

“Many Malians have the feeling that their country is kept apart from decisions in the fight against terrorism and consider that the reconquest of the integrity of the territory by the State must be a priority”, analyzes Aly Tounkara. “For the junta, tackling such a project allows it to register in the long term as an essential political actor and to relegate the elections to the rank of secondary issues. But if the Malians adhere to the principle of sovereignty, the management This question by the junta and the tensions it generates also arouse fears among the population. We must not be naive, in this fight against terrorism, France is also playing its influence in the region “, continues Aly Tounkara. “If private companies and Malian troops manage to achieve some victories, this could further strengthen anti-French sentiment and harm the interests of Paris. But for its part, Bamako, by freeing itself from France and its regional allies, takes the risk of finding oneself without reliable partners, ostracized, even more, in the anti-jihadist struggle in the Sahel. This would cause enormous disappointment, equal to the hopes that the junta arouses among the population. “