What nuclear weapons could Putin use in Ukraine?

Moscow has 2,000 small or “tactical” nuclear warheads A possible nuclear attack poses different scenarios: from an explosion in an uninhabited area to an attack on a Ukrainian city or a NATO country Experts doubt the strategic usefulness of these weapons to Russia’s objectives “It’s not a bluff,” Vladimir Putin warned a few days ago when he threatened to use nuclear weapons in his war with Ukraine. After Moscow’s humiliating defeat in Liman, it has been the Cheneno leader Ramzan Kadirov who has asked the Kremlin to move that piece. Is this a simple, and terrifying, deterrence strategy? Or is the Russian president really willing to take that step and break the nuclear taboo after the atomic bombs of Hiroshima and Nagasaki dropped by the United States in 1945? Those attacks at the end of World War II were recalled precisely by the Russian leader last Friday to point out that it was Washington that “set a precedent.” Military experts agree that this is a very reckless option for Putin and that, in addition, not guaranteeing him a victory on the ground would have long-term consequences that are not worth his while. However, there are also analysts who point out that although the risk of the Russian president using nuclear weapons is low, this risk is increasing as he accumulates failures on the battlefield. Russia has some 2,000 small nuclear weapons known as “tactical” weapons that vary according to their size and power. They are in warehouses from which, in the event of an attack, they would have to be moved to be attached to the missiles. These storage areas are monitored by US intelligence satellites, so Washington could detect these previous movements. Differences between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons Strategic nuclear weapons are long range and have the ability to destroy entire cities thousands of kilometers away. The tactics, the ones Russia is threatening to use in Ukraine, are smaller nuclear warheads. Tactical weapons are designed to be used on the battlefield, in a limited attack that seeks to destroy targets in specific areas. Despite their smaller size, some of these nuclear warheads can be more powerful than the bomb dropped by the United States on Hiroshima ( with a 20 kiloton explosion). Tactical nuclear missiles can cause an explosion of between one and 50 kilotons, Richard Barrons, a retired British Army general, explained to the BBC. The strategic ones have been regulated in international arms control treaties. Russia and the United States currently have a limit of 1,550, according to The New York Times. But tactical weapons have not been regulated. A Russian “Topol” strategic nuclear missile at a test range in Mirny, in a file image. PA Images via Getty Images How are Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons being used? They can be launched from land and sea and can be fitted to some systems used to deliver conventional explosives, such as Kalibr cruise missiles or Iskander ballistic missiles. Iskander missile launcher at an exhibition in Moscow (Russia), last August.GettyPossible scenarios of that nuclear attackExhibition of force. Putin could provoke a surgical strike, without looking for victims. For example, an underground explosion in the Black Sea; in an uninhabited area like Snake Island (a rocky island in that sea) or high up in the Ukrainian sky. The radioactive dust that is created at the time of the explosion is deposited on the ground 24 hours later, which could pose a great biological hazard. The wind could spread radioactive particles to other areas. Against a military target, a small town or a key infrastructure in Ukraine. For example, against the Zaporizhia nuclear power plant. According to US studies, cited by the Financial Times, a one-kiloton warhead would have to detonate 90 meters from a tank to cause significant damage. Russia could fire a six-inch-wide projectile from an artillery gun on Ukrainian soil or a half-ton warhead from a missile across the border, US officials reveal, on condition of anonymity, to The New York Times. The extent of the destruction and the radiation emitted also depends on the wind. Even small, a nuclear explosion can leave numerous victims and an area uninhabitable for years. However, it would not be reasonable, according to experts, for Putin to choose this option to attack Ukrainian areas controlled by Russia, since his own Army would be exposed to radioactive fallout. Against a NATO member country. The former head of the Carnegie Moscow Center, Dmitri Trenin, suggested this possibility last week in an interview on state television. He argued that for its deterrence to be effective, the Kremlin needs to show that its threat is serious. The weapon that most concerns European countries is the heavy warhead, which can be inserted on top of an Iskander-M missile and could hit cities in Western Europe. If Russia were to take this step, it would expose itself to an international response whose scope is difficult to imagine. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has warned Moscow of “serious consequences”. Risks outweigh any ‘gain’ Experts doubt the strategic usefulness of these weapons to achieve Moscow’s goals. Russia is also exposed to the fact that, depending on the evolution of the winds, the radioactive material released after an explosion moves towards its territory. On the other hand, he risks becoming even more of an international outcast. US President Joe Biden warned in a speech last September that the use of nuclear weapons would make the Russians “more outcasts than ever.” Moscow is exposed to Beijing withdrawing its support; and that is a high price for Putin. China and India still buy Russian oil and gas, but such an attack would lead the West to impose sanctions on these countries. The risks would ultimately outweigh any gains. In this sense, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW, for its acronym in English) determined last week that the use of nuclear weapons by the Russian president would be a bet “of limited profits that would not achieve the declared war objectives by Putin”. He assured that, in the best of cases, it would “freeze the front lines in their current position and allow the Kremlin to preserve the occupied territory”; but it would not allow Russian forces to capture the whole of Ukraine, Vladimir Putin’s initial goal. The last word has, however, the Russian leader. And that path is indecipherable.