OPINION | Six lessons the West has learned from the first 6 months of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

Six months have passed since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: what is the balance? 2:16 Editor’s Note: Daniel Treisman is Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles, and co-author of “Spin Dictators: The Changing Face of Tyranny in the 21st Century.” The opinions expressed in this comment belong solely to its author. (CNN) — Six months after Russian President Vladimir Putin sent troops to Ukraine, it remains unclear how this war will end. Ukraine, which has signaled its intention to launch a new counteroffensive, could retake the Russian-occupied city of Kherson and other parts of the south. But it is also possible that a reinforced Russian force will break through to Odessa, cutting off the Ukraine from the sea. Or the front line could more or less stabilize where it is.
Whatever happens, we can draw some lessons from the war so far. Its many surprises should force us to question our old assumptions. One of the main takeaways from the last half year is the importance of individual leaders. The “great men” theory of history is obsolete these days, given the tendency to see human events as the result of deep underlying forces. Obviously these are important. But if Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, had fled, as Putin apparently hoped, or failed to communicate effectively, the Ukrainian resistance might have been much weaker. Few anticipated that Zelensky, whose popularity ratings had plummeted before the Russian invasion, would prove such an inspiring hero. Similarly, if the president of Russia had been, say, Boris Yeltsin, thousands of war victims would almost certainly still be alive. Without Putin, there would be no war. Of course there are many angry nationalists in Russia. But outside the president’s narrow circle, only a tiny minority wanted to absorb Ukraine, according to the Levada Center, an independent Russian poll research organization. Judging by the shocked faces at the Kremlin Security Council meeting in February that preceded Putin’s attack, even many of his close associates were puzzled by his boss’s decision. Ukraine’s prowess on the battlefield also illustrates a second lesson: the underestimated power of the underdog. Over and over again, we assume that the militarily stronger side will prevail quickly. But that point of view ignores the importance of external support and morale. When the invasion began, almost everyone thought that Kyiv would fall in days. And yet, as we have seen in wars from Israel to Vietnam and now in Ukraine, the losers have often done much better than expected. Interestingly, Russia also enjoys a version of the luck of the underdog. Since February, the West has unleashed an unprecedented sanctions storm that some thought would crush Russia’s economy. Its medium-term prospects look bleak. But for now, the ruble has stabilized, the banking system has survived, unemployment remains low, and oil revenues are higher than last year. It helps that other countries that also resent Western dominance, from China and India to Turkey and Indonesia, have refused to isolate Putin. Putin’s actions also remind us of another key point: Unfettered autocrats make horrendous mistakes. Very often, revisionist wars are launched to redress “historical injustices.” These wars often go wrong, from Argentine President Leopoldo Galtieri’s attempt to seize the Falkland Islands from the UK in 1982 and Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, to the attempted coup by Greek generals in Cyprus in 1974. But the failures of the past have not prevented strong men from repeating those mistakes. If there is one thing we can learn from the Russian invasion of Ukraine, it is that we cannot plan only to defend ourselves against attacks that seem rational. Inside Russia, one notable surprise is the apparent success of Kremlin propaganda, even as conspiracy theories about the Nazis are spread in Kyiv. From the outside, these seemed too extreme to work, especially given the many personal ties that linked people from opposite sides of the border. Of course, it is difficult to measure public opinion in a police state at war. But reports that Russians believe the lies on television more than those of their own relatives in Ukraine have been surprising. The Kremlin’s disinformation success reflects years of repetition, which have primed viewers to believe terrible things about their neighbors. That and the natural desire to avoid admitting that they may be ruled by war criminals. In fact, polls suggest a growing desire to completely disengage from war. In July, 32% of Russian respondents said the “special military operation” was the most memorable event of the previous four weeks, up from 75% in March, according to the Levada Center. Support for the war is certainly not universal. Despite the intensification of the crackdown, a remarkable 18% of those surveyed continue to say that they oppose their country’s military actions. A big question for the next six months is whether discontent will become a threat to the Kremlin. The danger is less likely to come from anti-war sentiment itself than from possible outcry against economic hardship should sanctions go into effect. One final lesson is one that the West can no longer avoid. Putin’s aggression in Ukraine has removed any doubt that we are in a new Cold War. It will take skill to keep it from getting hot. This time, the West’s adversary is not just Russia, but an increasingly close partnership between the Kremlin and China. The idea that the United States could “pivot” from one to the other now seems quaint. As long as Putin remains in power, he will work to weaken the West. Although cooperation with China is still possible in some spheres, Xi Jinping also seems determined to challenge the power of the United States. A painful reckoning awaits the West in the next six months. In February we saw that democracies, while slow to react, can wake up once the threat becomes unmistakable. The unity of the West around Ukraine in the spring was impressive. The challenge now will be to maintain that cohesion during a winter of dwindling gas supplies, while Putin’s Western friends, from German companies eager to revive the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, to countless French and Italian politicians, They try to divide us. The looming energy crisis is just the beginning. The West has yet to bear the cost of defending itself against China, Russia, and other emerging threats. Since the late 1980s, Western leaders have pretended, like populist politicians on a binge, that they could expand NATO while simultaneously cutting military spending as part of the budget. Eager for a big “peace dividend”, they have left the alliance’s new borders, and the borderlands beyond them, lightly defended at best. This has to change, and it won’t be cheap. Putin’s last six months could hardly have been a greater failure. But, according to well-sourced analysts, as reported by Bloomberg News, Putin firmly believes that time is on his side, that the West will fracture under economic pressures. The next six months will show if he is right.