Mali: the junta “cuts the grass under the feet” of ECOWAS by announcing a two-year transition

Published on: 09/06/2022 – 16:56 It was in 2024 that the Malian junta decided on Monday to return power to civilians by committing to a transition by decree. A decision that surprised ECOWAS, while discussions to reach an agreement are still taking place. The organization seems to have been “taken aback” by the choice of the transitional government. Explanations. The face-to-face between Mali and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which has been going on for months, saw a new development on Monday 6 June. The head of the junta, Colonel Assimi Goïta, signed a decree read on state television and stipulating that “the duration of the transition (would be) set at 24 months, (from) March 26, 2022”. This choice is all the more surprising given that the Malian junta was still planning, last February, to return power to civilians, but after a five-year transition – which ECOWAS then described as a “totally unacceptable” delay. Discussions had since continued between the Malian transitional government and the West African organization, without however reaching a consensus on a date. An announcement that surprised as much within the transitional government as in the ranks of ECOWAS. “Government ministers have privately confided that they learned the news like everyone else on television”, was able to find out RFI, which also had the reaction of a diplomat from a member country of ECOWAS, for whom Mali “puts the cart before the horse”. Monday’s decree “is a way for the junta to speed up the end of the discussions and to endorse its desire to extend the transition for two years officially in the eyes of the Malian population and of the international community”, explains to France 24 Jérôme Pigné, co-founder of the network for strategic reflection on security in the Sahel and associate researcher at the Thomas More Institute. “ECOWAS taken aback” by the announcement of the Malian juntaThe “timing” chosen by the Malian junta owes nothing to chance: the signing of the decree took place two days after ECOWAS met in Ghana, the June 4, for an extraordinary summit devoted to examining the evolution of the political situation in Burkina Faso, Guinea and Mali. This did not allow any progress on the transition processes underway in the three countries, and the West African organization postponed its decision-making until its next summit, on July 3. The Malian junta may then have been guided by a double motivation by setting the horizon for March 2024, analyzes Jérôme Pigné: “The position of the transitional government is to pull the rug from under the feet of ECOWAS by showing that Mali remains sovereign and that it stands up to it, as well as that to the international community. On the other hand, it is also perhaps a way of going towards a form of one-upmanship by saying that if the West African organization does not revise its position – considered by some to be dogmatic -, Mali will decide its own fate.” ECOWAS was quick to react: the day after Colonel Goïta’s announcement, the organization published a press release in which it said it “take note of the signing” of the decree extending the transition period in Mali. “ECOWAS regrets that this decision was taken at a time when negotiations are still taking place, with a view to reaching a consensus”, also specifies the press release, which adds that discussions will continue with the Malian authorities. “ECOWAS may be taken aback by this announcement, since the objective (of June 4) was to give itself a few more weeks for the various parties to the negotiation to agree on a deadline, but above all on a chronogram and a roadmap. It is not enough to give a date, but to create the conditions for a return to constitutional order”, explains the researcher. The spokesperson for the Malian government, Colonel Abdoulaye Maïga, had assured Monday that he was “absolutely not afraid” of access to tension with ECOWAS. On the contrary, the decree “is very eloquent proof of the desire for dialogue”, justifying it by the desire to find a “compromise” between the “requirements” of ECOWAS and the “aspirations” of Malians for reforms before the holding of elections at the end of the transition.”The climate is slowly changing”The assumed choice of the junta is also to be considered within the framework of a “standoff” which has been going on for several months between the ECOWAS and Bamako. The West African organization, in reaction to the Malian government’s plan to stay in power for up to five more years, adopted “very heavy” economic and financial sanctions in January 2022.>> To read also – The sanctions of the ECOWAS constitute “a dead end for Mali as for its neighbors” The ECOWAS has notably decided to close the borders with Mali within the sub-regional space and to suspend trade other than basic necessities. It also cut off its financial aid and froze Mali’s assets at the Central Bank of West African States.”Five months of sanctions have passed, which weigh heavily on the junta, but above all on the daily lives of Malians”, explains Virginie Herz, international columnist at France 24. “Until then, these sanctions were perceived by the population and the junta as a kind of injustice, of relentlessness of the countries of the region supposedly ‘instrumentalised’ by France. There, the climate is slowly changing.” 03:30 © France 24 This change in atmosphere can be seen in particular in the few criticisms that emerge against the junta. That of Imam Mahmoud Dicko holds the attention: this emblematic figure of the protest movement against former President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, support of the junta since taking power in August 2020, criticized at the end of May “the arrogance” of the transitional government in power, without sparing the international community and “its pride”. transition… in order to obtain relief or a lifting of ECOWAS sanctions? “We will find out very quickly with the West African summit on July 3, and by then there will certainly be another visit from Goodluck Jonathan. [l’envoyé spécial de la Cédéao pour les négociations avec le Mali, NDLR] to the Malian authorities”, replies Jérôme Pigné. And the researcher concludes: “This diplomatic and political sequence should not take precedence over the security and military realities of everyday life, with growing insecurity in the so-called three-border area [un territoire sans délimitation physique entre le Mali, le Burkina Faso et le Niger].”