Ukraine-Russia War: “Putin’s Exit Strategy”

Vladimir Putin’s “exit strategy” for Ukraine after the “special military operation”. A strategy that could “be based mainly on the establishment of a pro-Russian government”. A “regime change, at least in that part of Ukraine that will be subjected to Russian control and the self-proclaimed people’s republics of Donetsk and Luhansk”, recognized only by Russia, “even if a territorial partition that goes beyond the Russian-speaking territories is unlikely”. In Belarus, to negotiate with the Kiev government. “Ukraine – he says – was left alone to fight a war against Russia that neither Moscow nor Kiev wanted”. And “it will not be Putin’s Afghanistan”. The “exit strategy” has existed since the beginning because “Putin is very clear what the outcome of a long-term war is” – the Russians first saw it in Afghanistan, then the US – and the risk in absence of the “conquest of a flash target” is an “asymmetric war of attrition”. At this point, according to Bertolotti, “it appears clear that Putin has made a strategic mistake” and “he could only remedy this by threatening to occupy the whole country and then withdraw with an agreement”. An agreement that, he continues, “could foresee the division of the country in two, on both sides of the natural border of the Dnieper River”, a “regime change”, in fact, and “the redefinition of the Ukrainian borders with the annexation of newly recognized Russian-speaking republics “, Donetsk and Luhansk. In any case, “the cornerstone of Moscow would be a pro-Russian government in Kiev”, an “essential condition” according to the expert, “even forcing the current government to accept a negotiation agreement for the benefit of Moscow”. Bertolotti invites not to forget “the Russian point of view”, the “historical aspects”, the “political perception firmly rooted within the Russian leadership of a besieged fortress”. Negotiating, while in the field – explains the expert – there are “a total of 250,000 Ukrainian soldiers against 190,000 Russian soldiers, a part of which in the reserve” and “theoretically the 250,000 Ukrainians would be a sufficient force to stop the Russian advance”. But “the superior operational capacity and the potential Russian reserve available leave little hope for the Ukrainian defense”, which “could give Moscow a hard time only if it turned into guerrilla forces”. “One wonders – he observes – if there is the opportunity and the need to help the Ukrainian resistance militarily “because” it would imply a continuation of the conflict, therefore an increase in deaths, destruction and very significant war damage “. And “helping the resistance” would mean “transforming the war from conventional to asymmetric with guerrilla techniques” and “very painful” consequences for Russia and Ukraine. According to Bertolotti, the international community is not interested in this, “unless it is inserted in the objective of weakening Putin, not so much to help Ukraine”. Here the US role is “fundamental” which “could make a difference” in a “perspective of containment of Russian and Putin politics.” An Alliance “which cannot be directly involved by statute”, Ukraine is not an ally, and which “could be interested by chance, but at the moment it is not and it will not be”. And, he concludes, “in the long run we must interpret Russia’s national ambition, based on a desire to establish the equilibrium that had consolidated during the Cold War”, both “from the point of view of influence and of physical presence in that which was the old Soviet bloc “. And “to add the expansion of Russia’s interest even in areas where it was not present or severely limited”. The Mediterranean, the countries that overlook the Mediterranean from North Africa to the Middle East. Starting with Libya and Syria.