With the end of Barkhane, the UN faces an additional security issue in Mali

The peacekeepers of the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Mali (Minusma) are again in mourning. Seven of them were killed Wednesday, December 8 by an explosive device in the center of the country. The day before, a member of the UN mission had already perished from his wounds in Dakar, after having also been affected by an explosion on November 22 in northern Mali.

Deployed in July 2013, seven months after the start of the French operation against the jihadists in northern Mali, the Minusma, which has some 11,000 soldiers, 2,000 police officers as well as civilian teams in the field, its mission is in particular to support the application of the 2015 peace agreement, the restoration of State authority and the protection of civilians.

But with the deterioration of the security situation in the country, the UN mission has suffered heavy losses since its creation: more than 150 of its members have been killed by hostile acts, according to UN statistics.

To better understand the difficulties of the peacekeepers on the ground, France 24 spoke with Brigadier General Philippe Pottier, Chief of Staff of the Force of the Minusma.

France 24: Since its creation, the Minusma has been the target of numerous attacks and recorded a record number of human losses. How to explain this heavy toll ?

Brigadier General Philippe Pottier : We operate in a context of asymmetric war, imposed by the jihadists. More often than not, they aim at us with concealed explosive devices or with artillery fire and then escape. These so-called “harassment” shots, which generally last about ten minutes, create an effect of surprise and make the response very difficult since the attackers quickly leave the area.

These indirect attacks constitute 90% of the assaults our troops face. But we sometimes have to face direct assaults, such as on January 20 against our base in Aguelhoc, north of the Kidal region, which, although it claimed the lives of 10 peacekeepers, turned our heads. advantage.

Other UN missions face indirect attacks around the world. But they are in Mali on an unprecedented scale and cause heavy losses in our ranks.

What measures have you put in place to better protect your workforce in the field?

This subject is the subject of permanent reflection. With each attack, we try to adapt our system to limit the risks. For example, the security of the Aguelhoc camp has been significantly strengthened since the attack. We recently equipped the battalion with observation mini-drones present in all the camps to monitor the surroundings of our bases and detect attacks upstream.

We also do a lot of work with our escort units, during our convoy trips, to locate and destroy the concealed explosive devices that cause the vast majority of our human losses. Today we manage to discover about 70% of these machines.

But if this work makes it possible to mitigate the threat, the war is played on two sides and our enemy is also adapting by increasing the attacks. Between 2020 and 2021, the number of incidents related to improvised explosive devices recorded in the country increased from 158 to 226.

Minusma must also protect civilians against the jihadist threat, how does this mission work on the ground? ?

Minusma alone cannot restore security in Mali and our role is not to replace the Malian army. We act in support of the national army during its operations and organize medical repatriation operations for them when necessary. However, the Minusma enjoys a robust mandate that goes beyond that of a classic peace mission. It authorizes us to take proactive measures, in particular for the protection of civilians.

Our mandate includes respect for the peace agreement [signé en 2015 entre la République du Mali et la Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad NDLR], but not all armed groups have signed it. We are therefore considered a privileged target by the groups which are opposed to it.

The situation is even more complicated in the center, where there is no peace agreement and where we face violence linked to jihadists but also ethnic conflicts as well as banditry. We are trying to increase the number of patrols in areas that are subject to recurrent attacks, as is currently the case between Mopti and Bandiagara.

Our presence has a deterrent effect for the jihadists who generally prefer to avoid us. This is why they are increasing the attacks on the main roads in order to reduce our presence and our freedom of action in the villages they are trying to take control of.

We sometimes record successes, as in Ogossagou, where we managed to secure the area and started discussions between rival communities which led to the signing of a peace agreement in October.

But despite our efforts, we must recognize that the general situation is deteriorating for civilians in the center. While the jihadists have so far attacked state officials, infrastructure and crops instead to put pressure on the villagers, the recent attack on the bus carrying civilians in Songho constitutes a further step towards horror .

In this degraded context, does the redeployment of French troops with the end of Operation Barkhane represent an additional threat for your troops?

This development does not necessarily have a direct impact on the losses recorded within our ranks. This week’s attack in the Mopti region, which claimed the lives of seven peacekeepers, took place in an area where Barkhane is not present. On the other hand, the closure of the bases of Kidal, Tessalit and Timbuktu necessarily removes a security bubble for Minusma, because the presence of Barkhane had a certain deterrent effect for the jihadists.

In the north, we are maintaining the support of the French army, which, in the event of an imminent and serious threat, can deploy operational military support. But the response time is necessarily longer due to the redeployment of troops to the “three borders” area, in the center, in particular with regard to land interventions. This redeployment is bound to have consequences; indirect mortar fire could become more frequent in the absence of Barkhane’s patrols.

The end of the Barkhane mission will cause us additional security work with a constant workforce, since our mandate was renewed in June without increase. Our challenge today is to make our force more agile and responsive, particularly in the deployment of transport and attack helicopters. This work, started in 2019, aims to optimize our capacities to better cover the territory and continue to support the Malian soldiers in the most effective way possible.