Crisis between Riyadh and Beirut: what political and economic consequences for Lebanon?

Published on : 11/01/2021 – 6:43 PM

Lebanon called, Monday 1^er November, Saudi Arabia in “dialogue” to settle the serious diplomatic crisis between the two countries, provoked by Riyadh’s anger against remarks by Lebanese Minister of Information, George Kordahi. Before his appointment to the government, the latter had described as “absurd” the military intervention of the Wahhabi kingdom in Yemen.

After recalling its ambassador from Beirut – an initiative emulated by several Gulf countries – and requesting the departure of the Lebanese ambassador to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia halted imports from Lebanon on Friday, dealing a severe blow to the country. economy of a country in financial sinking.

While the minister in question, supported by Hezbollah, does not intend to resign, the government of Prime Minister Najib Mikati finds itself very weakened.

To understand the consequences of this crisis between the two countries, France 24 interviewed Karim Sader, consultant specializing in Gulf countries.

How do you explain this crisis? And what can be its political consequences in Lebanon?

Karim Sader: It should first be remembered that bilateral relations between these two countries, since the election in 2016 of President Michel Aoun, thanks in particular to his alliance with Hezbollah, are not good. Riyadh cannot digest the strong and growing influence exerted by the pro-Iranian Shiite party on Lebanon, a country in which the kingdom has nevertheless invested heavily. The Lebanese Minister’s statements, which allowed Riyadh to initiate this crisis, are a timely pretext for Crown Prince Mohammed ben Salman [MBS], who absolutely wanted to bang his fist on the table and call his Western allies to order. Because in his eyes, Paris and Washington, specifically, have been very conciliatory and passive vis-à-vis Tehran on the Lebanese scene. In recent months, the episode of the formation of the government, marked by a strong imprint of Hezbollah, and that of the arrival in Lebanon of tankers carrying Iranian fuel ordered by the Shiite party, ignoring the risk of sanctions Americans, are seen as snub to the Saudis.

The reaction of MBS is all the more muscular as it reflects his need to come out of a certain isolation, since his international quarantine after the election of Joe Biden, further illustrated by his absence from the last G20. The Lebanese scene allows it to reassert itself on the regional scene and to demonstrate that Saudi Arabia has important levers to influence both politically and economically on the country of the Cedar. A country dear to Westerners and the French in particular. Thus, the first of these levers is to be able to pose the threat of a torpedoing of the government of Najib Mikati, which was so laboriously formed after long months of negotiations. France and the United States, which gave their blessing to its formation, do not want to hear about the slightest destabilization of this government or the resignation of the Prime Minister, while since the start of this crisis, the scenario of its fall has been mentioned on several occasions in Lebanon.

What could be the consequences of this crisis on a Lebanese economy already in tatters?

The context is terrible for Lebanon, financially strangled and deprived of international aid. This is why Riyadh chooses its moment well. The economy is Riyadh’s last direct lever in the country, having lost great influence on political actors since his divorce from the camp of former Prime Minister Saad Hariri. This crisis does not bode well for Lebanon and can cost it dearly economically because of its heavy dependence on the Gulf petromonarchies, with Saudi Arabia in the lead. The country of the Cedar is more than ever dependent on currency transfers from its diaspora, knowing that a large majority of its expatriates generate their income from the Gulf countries, since there are nearly 550,000 living in the region. , including nearly 350,000 in Saudi Arabia. Currencies that Lebanon is sorely lacking after the restrictions imposed by banks on dollar withdrawals and the end of international subsidies. The Saudi economic retaliatory measures, namely the embargo against Lebanese imports, are also a blow: there is talk of 300 million dollars a year in lost earnings for Lebanon. The latter is not a country that aims to export, but 10% of its total exports go to Saudi Arabia. So by knocking on the wallet, Riyadh reminds the Lebanese that their complacency towards Hezbollah can cost them dearly, in the true sense of the word, and that it can be a factor in Lebanon’s isolation in its Arab environment.

As the standoff continues, what can be the scenario for exiting the crisis?

Saudi Arabia does not wish to bring about the downfall of the government so as not to alienate its Western allies. Riyadh’s maneuver is to be linked to the impulsive and instinctive policy of MBS, which often begins with a strong initiative or gesture, before ending up by moderating its ardor and moving in the direction of de-escalation. No one has forgotten the episode during which he had simply forcibly retained, in the kingdom, Saad Hariri, whom he had forced to resign from his post as Prime Minister, before allowing him to return to Lebanon after the intervention by President Emmanuel Macron. In the current case, Saudi Arabia having already flaunted its capacity for nuisance, or at least the levers at its disposal, and the diplomatic message having been transmitted and received, one might expect to see it temper its positions. . First, by avoiding taking sanctions against Lebanese expatriates, which would be almost fatal for the Lebanese economy. In order to be able to influence Lebanese politics, the Saudis have every interest in keeping these expatriates in their favor by allowing them to continue to benefit from the Gulf economy, since the latter will be called upon to vote in the next legislative elections in March. .