Martial laws with variable geometry: Vladimir Putin and the illusion of control of the situation

Russian President Vladimir Putin decided on Wednesday to establish martial law in the annexed Ukrainian territories and to set up special regimes on Russian territory which appear as light martial laws. A way of reasserting its authority in the face of emerging protest. A big dose of martial law for the occupied territories annexed by Russia in Ukraine, and another lighter one for the rest of Russia. Vladimir Putin signed two decrees on Wednesday (October 19th) to establish different degrees of emergency rule to strengthen his control over the country. The four regions of Ukraine that Moscow claims to have annexed after controversial referendums – Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporijjia – will be subjected to the most draconian device. It is martial law as defined by a text with constitutional value adopted in 2002. Martial law for propaganda purposes It authorizes the regional and military authorities on the spot to use a vast arsenal of restrictive or confiscatory measures. They may ban residents from leaving their cities, may seize property belonging to the local population, may institute censorship or decide to forcibly relocate individuals. Foreigners on the spot will also be likely to be interned without the authorities having to justify themselves. On paper, this inventory of powers seems to give local authorities a more important role. But, in reality, “a de facto martial law already reigned in the regions annexed by Moscow. This text only formalizes the situation”, assures Jeff Hawn, specialist in Russian military questions and external consultant for the New Lines Institute, a American center for geopolitical research. >> See also: For Dmytro Kuleba, the annexation of the Ukrainian regions by Putin changes “nothing” For the two regions of Donbass – Donetsk and Luhansk -, the change will be even less pronounced since “the populations were subject to a law martial law imposed by the pro-Russian authorities since even before the war”, recalls Huseyn Aliyev, specialist in Russian security policies and the conflict in Ukraine at the University of Glasgow. If the official establishment of martial law does not change the situation on the field, “it is important from the point of view of the story that Moscow wants to sell to its people”, assures Huseyn Aliyev. For him, it is a way “to recognize that the ‘special operation’ in Ukraine [désignation officielle de la guerre par le Kremlin, NDLR] does not go as planned, without saying so clearly. “Martial law also prepares Russian public opinion for the evacuation of the city of Kherson if the Ukrainian counter-offensive is successful. “A withdrawal from Kherson will then be easier to justify if the Russian population is already aware that the situation there was complicated”, concludes Huseyn Aliyev.Light martial law to bring Russia to heelIt is not the same logic that justifies the establishment of light martial laws on Russian territory The presidential decree provides that the eight territories closest to Ukraine – the city of Sevastopol, Crimea and the Rostov and Krasnodar oblasts to the south, as well as the provinces of Belgorod, Kursk, Bryansk, from Voronezh up the Ukrainian border to the north – will be subject to a special regime similar to that imposed on the inhabitants of Ukrainian regions. Restrictions on movement, possibility of moving people ons, establishment of a military administration which will work with the local authorities or even reinforced censorship are on the menu for the local populations. Certain measures, such as the limitation of car traffic and public transport, are even supposed to be applied in Moscow and in the rest of central Russia. But the mayor of the capital, Sergei Sobyanin, announced that he did not want these decrees to have an impact on the daily lives of Muscovites. It is not impossible because these special regimes “are defined in a very vague way in the decree, thus leaving a vast field of interpretation for those who are going to apply them”, notes Luke March, specialist in Russian politics at the university. of Edinburgh. This work of exegete of the Poutinian thought will return mainly “to the regional governors who will thus find themselves with much more powers”, underlines Jeff Hawn. For him, this is the whole point of “light” martial laws: they give Vladimir Putin’s most loyal henchmen – the provincial governors – additional means of suppressing any dissenting voice or popular protest that might try to emerge because of the military setbacks that are increasingly difficult to conceal.”Until now, the Kremlin could ensure the loyalty of local authorities through financial largesse, but with international sanctions, the resources are beginning to run out for the regime, which must find new “other means to maintain control. With these decrees, the Kremlin signals that it will henceforth use the stick more”, summarizes Jeff Hawn. But the carrot is never far away. “It is revealing to note that the decree provides for the possibility for local councilors to requisition property without detailing the contours of this power”, underlines Luke March. A way of leaving the door open for the authorities the possibility of keeping part of the loot for themselves. Protecting the Russians from the “big bad West” The vagueness of these decrees is also a way for Vladimir Putin to establish a more martial law lasts in Russia without saying so. The political and military authorities responsible for applying the new special regimes, aware that their loyalty may be judged by the yardstick of their zeal, will be tempted to do more than not enough. “The risk is that Russia will quickly turn into a garrison state,” said Jeff Hawn. In other words, local politicians, anxious to prove that they have an iron fist, will push the security services to occupy the ground as much as possible. These new measures also became necessary to remain consistent with the shift in official Kremlin propaganda. The power insists more and more often on the fact that the war in Ukraine is a struggle of Russia against NATO as a whole. Vladimir Putin does not miss an opportunity to pose as a great defender of Russia, threatened in its integrity by the entire West. Thus, Moscow has accused Ukrainian “terrorists” supported by the West of being behind the recent explosion on the Crimean bridge.>> Read also: The attack on the Crimean bridge, the culmination of the Russian setbacks in Ukraine Problem: he had not yet undertaken anything concrete to “protect” the Russian population. These light martial laws “represent the response of power to ensure the safety of the Russians”, believes Huseyn Aliyev. But it is a risky bet because after the disputed “partial mobilization” in the country, these measures prove once again that the war is a tangible reality for the population. This is not what Vladimir Putin promised the Russians at the start of the special operation. The risk is to arouse more protest. And then in Russia, martial law has never been associated with happy episodes for power. There were forms of it at the height of the German offensive in Russia during the Second World War and some measures approaching it were applied at the time of the failed coup of 1991. But the last to have established a martial law over the majority of Russian territory was Tsar Nicholas II, shortly before being overthrown by the October Revolution in 1917. This is not the best of precedents for Vladimir Putin.